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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

Case No: 20150598-SC

MICHAEL ROWAN,
REBECCA GEORGE,
Defendants / Appellants.

REPLACEMENT BRIEF OF APPELLEES
****
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in the case involving Michael
Rowan pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code §78A-3-102(3)(i) as an appeal
from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony.
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in the case involving Rebecca
George pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code §78A-3-102(3)(b) as a case
certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by
the Court of Appeals. The Court consolidated the cases on November 20, 2015
after a stipulated motion by the parties.1

The trial court prepared a record for each defendant on appeal. Many of the
pleadings are contained in each record. However, there are some documents only
found in Rowan’s record. To the extent that some of the relevant documents are
not contained in one record or another, defendants do not claim the State has
1

ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
1. Whether the trial court erred when it found the warrant affidavit did not
support probable cause. This Court will “review a district court’s assessment of a
magistrate’s probable cause determination for correctness and ask whether the
district court erred in concluding that the magistrate did not have a substantial
basis for his or her probable cause determination.” State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53,
¶12, 267 P.3d 210.2 The Court will review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny
a motion to suppress based on an illegal search as a mixed question of law and
fact. State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ¶17, 332 P.3d 937. “We review the factual
findings underlying a grant of a motion to suppress evidence under a ‘clearly
erroneous’ standard, and review the trial court’s conclusions of law based thereon
for correctness.” State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah App 1993) (citing State
v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854-55 (Utah 1992)).
failed to preserve or provide an adequate record. The cases have been
consolidated on appeal and defendants will treat the records as though they are
one combined record. To be consistent with the State’s brief, citations to the
electronic record from Michael Rowan’s case will be designated by the letter “R”,
and citations to the electronic record from Rebecca George’s case will be
designated by the letter “G”.
2 Defendants contend that the “substantial basis” standard of review can be
attributed to the United States Supreme Court’s interpretations of Fourth
Amendment cases. See State v. Norris, 2001 UT ¶14, 48 P.3d 872 (the line of
cases leads to Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527
(1983)). Because this case is being raised under the Utah Constitution, and
because this Court has not yet disclosed the Utah standard of review involved in a
district court’s assessment of a magistrate’s probable cause determination in
issuing a warrant, Defendants suggest this Court should apply the simple
standard of review applied in similar circumstances: the factual questions
reviewed for clear error; and the existence of probable cause reviewed for
correctness. An argument supporting the use of this standard will be made below.
2

The question of probable cause was preserved, to the extent it was
preserved, by the “State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress”. R.04153. In its pleadings to the trial court, the State preserved four arguments: (1) the
“CI” demonstrated sufficient credibility to support the warrant (R.044-47); (2)
probable cause supported the search of “All Persons, All Residence” (R.047-48);
and (3) the officer corroborated the “CI” information (R.048-49). At oral
argument, the State submitted the initial question of probable cause “on the
documentation.” R.266. Any other probable cause arguments were not preserved
by the State.
2. Whether this Court should reverse its prior holdings that article I,
section 14, of the Utah Constitution requires exclusion of evidence obtained from
illegal searches and seizures. The State’s suggestion, that the existence of a state
exclusionary rule is merely a matter of constitutional interpretation reviewed for
correctness, is only half right. State’s Brief at 3. In reality, this Court is not only
interpreting the Utah Constitution, it is deciding whether its current precedent
regarding the Utah Constitution should be abandoned. In this circumstance the
Court reviews challenges to its former interpretations of the Utah Constitution in
light of the doctrine of stare decisis, and it will not overrule its precedents lightly.
State v. Guard, 2015 UT 96, ¶33. Although courts of last resort are not bound to
mechanically apply stare decisis, the “presumption against overruling” precedent
can be quite weighty. Guard, 2015 UT 96, ¶33 (citing Eldridge v. Johndrow,
2015 UT 21, ¶22, 345 P.3d 553).

3

The State preserved this issue in its Response to Address Good Faith
Exception Under Utah Constitution, where it argued the trial court should
“abandon the precedent regarding the exclusionary rule under article I, section
14, of the Utah Constitution” because the precedent lacked “proper scrutiny”.
R.102. The State preserved the arguments that the Utah exclusionary rule is not
supported by the text of section 14, the history of the constitutional convention
does not support exclusion, section 14 is not self-executing, and exclusion
constitutes bad public policy. R.104-10.
3. Whether this Court should create an as-yet unrecognized good faith
exception to Utah’s exclusionary rule. The question of whether Utah’s
exclusionary rule is subject to a good faith exception has not been decided by this
Court. See State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 420 (“We leave for another day the
issue of whether to apply in appropriate circumstances a good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.”). The trial
court declined to create a good faith exception and this Court should review
whether to create an exception for correctness.
The argument for a good faith exception was preserved by the State in its
Response to Address Good Faith Exception Under Utah Constitution where it
argued the trial court should apply the interstitial model of constitutional
analysis, thereby foregoing any analysis of whether any independent good faith
exception applies to Utah’s Constitution. R.112-28. The State also argued a good
faith exception should apply to Utah’s Constitution because Utah’s exclusionary

4

rule, like the federal rule, “is a judicial remedy designed to deter future
constitutional violations by law enforcement” and “not a constitutional
requirement.” R.131.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in full in the Addenda.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
The State of Utah appeals from the final order of the district court
dismissing the charges following the suppression of evidence that substantially
impaired the State’s ability to proceed to trial. The trial court ruled that the police
illegally obtained evidence during an unlawful search of the defendants’ home.
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Michael Rowan (Rowan) was charged with (1) Distribution of or Arranging
to Distribute a Controlled Substance (marijuana) in a Drug Free Zone; a second
degree felony; (2) Possession of a Controlled Substance (marijuana) with Intent
to Distribute with Prior Conviction in a Drug Free Zone, a first degree felony; (3)
Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance (psilocybin) with Prior Conviction in
a Drug Free Zone, a first degree felony; (4) Possession or Use of a Firearm by
Restricted Person, a third degree felony, and (5) Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor. R.001-02. Both
Rowan and Rebecca George (George) were charged with (6) Endangerment of a
Child or Vulnerable Adult, a third degree felony. R.002, G.002.

5

Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized in the search of their
home, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause under both
the state and federal constitutions. R.027-37. The State opposed the motion.
R.263-68; G.104. After argument, the trial court denied the motion, concluding
that although the warrant was not supported by probable cause, the evidence
should not be suppressed because of the federal good faith exception articulated
in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). R.226-32, 269-81; G.84-78, 105.
Defendants subsequently supplemented their argument and asked the trial court
for a ruling on the question of the good faith exception under the Utah
constitution. R.070-80. In response, the State argued that there is no basis for an
exclusionary rule under the Utah Constitution and, even if there were, it should
include a good faith exception analogous to the federal Leon exception. R.088146. The trial court heard additional argument and then granted the Defendants’
motion to suppress, declining to overrule the state exclusionary rule, and
declining to recognize a good faith exception. R.180-94, 282-90; G.051-37.
On the State’s motion, the trial court dismissed the charges against
Defendants on the ground that suppression of evidence substantially impaired
the State’s cases. R.241, 247; G.092, 098.
The State timely appealed both cases. R.251-52; G.101-100. After this Court
elected to retain the Rowan case on its docket, the court of appeals certified the
George case for transfer to this Court and the cases were consolidated. R.306.

6

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS3
1. “On August 28, 2012, a district court judge authorized a search warrant for a
residence located at [address deleted] in Provo, Utah.” R.227.
2. “The warrant issued based on the supporting affidavit of Officer Steven O. Pratt
of the Springville Police Department.” R.227
3. “Law enforcement officers executed the warrant on the same day it issued.”
R.227.
4. “The information supporting the warrant came primarily from a confidential
informant. (“the Confidential Informant”).” R.227.
5. “The Confidential Informant was cooperating with the police in exchange for
leniency on pending charges.” R.227, 062.
6. “The Confidential Informant told police that a person named Mike was in
possession of marijuana and would sell it to the Confidential Informant.”
R.227, 272.
7. “The Confidential Informant stated that he had been in Mike’s home in the
past, but did not say when.” R.227, 272.
8. “The Confidential Informant stated that he had purchased drugs from Mike.
Defendants take this Statement of Relevant Facts verbatim from the trial court’s
“Findings of Fact” within its ruling on the motion to suppress, most of which
refer to the transcript of a hearing at which the court made oral findings. R.22730.
Because the State has not alleged any errors in the trial court’s factual findings,
and neither do Defendants, the trial court’s written findings of facts are
definitive. To the extent the State has taken away from, or added to, the trial
court’s written findings of fact, without making a challenge thereto, this Court
should ignore the State’s factual recitation.
3
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(Transcript, p.2, lines 15-16).” R.227, 272.
9. “The Confidential Informant further stated that (1) Mike sells marijuana in
bulk; (2) Mike’s product is vacuum-sealed; (3) Mike travels to California to
obtain marijuana to sell in Utah; (4) Mike keeps his marijuana in a residence
located at [address deleted] in Provo; (6) Mike is a martial arts master and is
very familiar with the art of combat; (7) the Confidential Informant has heard
Mike speak of firearms in the past, but did not say when; and (8) the
Confidential Informant believed there may be a firearm in Mike’s residence,
but offered no facts to substantiate this belief.” R.227-28, 272-73.
10. “The information provided by the Confidential Informant to police purported
to be based in the Confidential Informant’s personal knowledge.” R.228, 273.
11. “The police tried to identify Mike by checking records on the residence, vehicle
registrations, and other police records, but were ultimately unsuccessful in
corroborating any of the information that the Confidential Informant
provided.” R.228, 273.
12. “The police did not attempt to corroborate independently any of the other
information provided by the Confidential Informant.”4 R.228, 273.

The following was attached as a footnote to the trial court’s finding number 12.
“The failure of the police to corroborate any of the Informant’s information and
failure to ‘control’ the buy in which the Informant participated stand in stark
contrast to representations in the Affidavit. There, the affiant swears that ‘the
[Informant] has provided creditable information and has not said anything that
would prove false or misleading. The information the [Informant] has given has
been investigated and proved credible.” (Affidavit, ¶4). The only measure police
took to corroborate the Informant’s claims was to conduct a buy which they failed
4
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13. “Instead, the police arranged for what was intended to be a “controlled” buy,
although the controls were at best slipshod.” R.228, 273.
14. “The police searched the Confidential Informant’s person and found no
controlled substances.” R.228, 273.
15. “The Confidential Informant then made a call to a person the Confidential
Informant identified as Mike. Police monitored the call.” R.228, 273.
16. “The Confidential Informant agreed to purchase a certain amount of marijuana
for a certain amount of money from the person who was on the phone.” R.229,
273.
17. “The sale would take place at the [address deleted] address in Provo.” R.229,
27.
18. “Police issued buy money to the Confidential Informant.” R.229, 273.
19. “For reasons that remain puzzling, police then allowed the Confidential
Informant—a known user of controlled substances whose cooperation with
police was given in exchange for leniency on pending charges—to get back into
his own vehicle and drive to the residence at [address deleted] in Provo.”
R.229, 273-74, 062.
20. “Police did not search the vehicle for controlled substances before the
Confidential Informant drove to the residence.” R.229, 274.
21. “The Confidential Informant went into the house. A short time later, police

to control. Other investigation yielded no information. At best, these
representations in the Affidavit are conclusory, at worst misleading.” R.228.
9

observed the Confidential Informant exit the residence.” R.229, 274, 062].
22. “Again, the Confidential Informant was allowed to drive his own vehicle from
the residence to a predetermined location where he met the police.” R.229,
062.
23. “Police searched the Confidential Informant’s person and discovered a
controlled substance. The buy money was not discovered on the Confidential
Informant’s person.” R.229, 274, 062.
24. “Police did not search the Confidential Informant’s vehicle after the buy.”
R.230, 274.
In addition to the facts specifically noted in the trial court’s findings, the
affidavit in support of the warrant also contained the following relevant
information:
The affiant met the Confidential Informant within “the past 72 hours” of
requesting the warrant. R.062. Although the Confidential Informant claimed “Mike
keeps marijuana inside his residence”, the Confidential Informant admitted he did
not know where it was kept. R.062.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The trial court correctly concluded that the warrant was not supported
by probable cause because the affidavit relied upon conclusory statements,
unspecific and unverified information, and a ‘controlled’ buy which was anything
but controlled. The police had no reason to believe the drugs found on the
Confidential Informant did not come from his car which they neglected to search.

10

Even under the substantial basis standard the trial court would have been correct
in concluding that the magistrate’s decision was erroneous because the affidavit
did not demonstrate a substantial basis to believe evidence of illegal conduct
would be found in the defendants’ home. Under the traditional, mixed standard
of review, the trial court correctly concluded the warrant was not supported by
probable cause.
In the alternative, this Court could affirm because the trial court could have
concluded the warrant was improper because the police omitted crucial
information that misled the magistrate on issues critical to the determination of
the informant’s credibility. The officer’s alleged that the Confidential Informant
was reliable based on his record of not providing false or misleading information
in the past, but the officer neglected to admit that the informant had never
provided them any information before, true or false. That omission misled the
magistrate into crediting the Confidential Informant as a reliable proven source
rather than an unproven criminal looking to gain favor in his own case. Because
the officer provided misleading information in the affidavit, this Court could
strike the misleading information and conclude the affidavit was wholly
inadequate to support the issuance of a search warrant.
2. This Court should not overrule the Utah cases that recognize the
exclusionary rule in Article I, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution. The existence
of a state exclusionary rule is supported by the text of the Utah Constitution, by
the intent of the framers, and by the historical context and cases at the time of
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ratification. This Court should reaffirm its precedent that violations of Article I,
Section 14, are subject to exclusion as a constitutionally required remedy, not
merely a judicial tool for deterrence.
3. This Court should not recognize a good faith exception to Utah’s
exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is not merely a judicially crafted remedy
to deter police misconduct, it is the natural manifestation of the “right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects”. Exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence is the essence of the right. Exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence puts the people back into the state which existed prior to the
violation, it reestablishes a person’s security guaranteed by the language of the
constitution. A good faith exception undermines these purposes. A good faith
exception undermines the warrant issuing process by diminishing the incentive
the police have to actually establish probable cause and insulating the reviewing
judges from any scrutiny. A good faith exception obliterates the fundamental
constitutional requirement that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause.
ARGUMENT
I. THE WARRANT WAS ISSUED WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE AND
WITHOUT A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS TO FIND PROBABLE CAUSE
A. Relevant Standard of Review
The standard of review may be of interest to this Court as it considers how
to interpret the Utah Constitution and how cases like this one, where a warrant
was issued and then later invalidated after a motion to suppress. The State’s Brief
cites Norris, 2001 UT 104 for the proposition that reviewing courts “afford[]
12

great deference to the magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant.” State’s
Brief at 3. The State goes on to cite the United States Supreme Court in support of
its claim that this Court will not examine de novo whether or not probable cause
existed, but only whether the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that
probable cause existed. State’s Brief at 3 (quoting Massachusetts v. Upton, 466
U.S. 727, 728, 104 S.C.t 2085, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984)).
“The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is a civil
right.” Allen v. Trueman, 110 P.2d 355 (Utah 1941) (J. Wolfe concurring). So too
would be the right to be protected from a search warrants issued without
probable cause. The problem with the standard of review proposed by the State,
and imposed by the federal case law, is that is destroys the probable cause
standard, thereby diminishing individual civil rights. The plain language of the
right is that warrants “shall not issue but upon probable cause.” The obvious
meaning of that language is that we have the right not to have a magistrate issue
a warrant to search or seize us or our property without probable cause.
In reality, the standard of review applied under the federal constitution
adds an asterisk to the Fourth Amendment, and in a small font in a footnote the
federal constitution now says “Warrants may actually issue without probable cause
so long as the magistrate has a substantial basis to conclude probable cause may exist,
regardless of whether or not probable cause actually does exist.” How this standard

can be said to protect one of our most inviolate and sacred rights is a mystery.
Probable cause is probable cause. Halfway, or ¾ of the way to probable cause
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may be a substantial basis, but it is not probable cause. Any standard that would
uphold the issuance of a warrant without requiring 100 percent of probable cause
should give pause to a court seeking to follow the text of the constitution.
Instead of applying the substantial basis standard, as the federal courts
have applied to the Fourth Amendment, Defendants urge this Court, as it takes
the opportunity to consider the section 14, to apply a standard of review that
adequately accounts for the significance and simplicity of the right the
government has allegedly violated. After all, if the same constitutional right is
afforded a non-deferential correctness review when a search occurs without a
warrant5 (i.e. Did probable cause exist when the police searched an automobile
on the side of the road?), why should the existence of an invalid warrant
undermine or diminish a person’s right to be free from government interference
with a less demanding standard (i.e. Even though no probable cause existed, did
the magistrate have a substantial basis to find probable cause to issue the
warrant?)? The obvious answer, the answer that strictly interprets the language
of the constitution is that the existence of a warrant shouldn’t undermine or
diminish the probable cause standard. Probable cause is probable cause, whether
this Court is reviewing a district court’s finding of probable cause for an
automobile search or a magistrate’s finding of probable cause in the issuance of a

See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶15, 103 P.3d 699 (Utah 2004) (this Court
abandoned “the standard which extended ‘some deference’ to the application of
law to the underlying factual findings in search and seizure cases in favor of nondeferential review.”).
5
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warrant, the right is the same and probable cause is the same, so too should be
the standard of review.
However, the State in its brief and the federal case law support the
distinction between the standard in warrant and non-warrant cases. The State
argues that this Court “may not invalidate the warrant simply because it might
have reached a different result”. State’s Brief at 14. In other words, according to
the State, this Court may not invalidate a warrant even if it was not supported by
probable cause. According to this federal precedent, this Court’s ability to review
a challenged search or seizure based on a warrant is distinct (and constrained) as
compared to its ability and practice to review a search or seizure made without a
warrant.
Applying this rule, imagine the police are investigating the activity at two
adjoining houses and collect the same amount of evidence in support of their
intended search for each house, evidence which does not reach the level of
probable cause, and the police obtain a warrant in one instance and decline to
request a warrant in the other. The house without the warrant is entitled to the
full protection of the probable cause standard, the search of this home would be
illegal. But the house with the warrant is denied the protection of the probable
cause standard, and some unclear metric, something less than probable cause,
may be found to justify the search.
According to the State, this distinction is appropriate because “the
resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined
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by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” State’s Brief at 14 (quoting United
States v. Vantresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684). In other
words, because we like warrants and we want to encourage the police to seek
warrants, if it is a close case where we are not sure whether probable cause
existed but a warrant was obtained, courts are going to uphold the search,
regardless of the actual existence of probable cause. Apparently for the State, tie
goes to the warrant, as opposed to the constitution.
But this problematic reasoning actually goes further than that. The federal
courts, in an effort to encourage the police to request a warrant, have decided to
reduce the amount of evidence needed to support a warrant if the officers are
willing to go to the trouble of requesting it. Vantresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (“this
Court, strongly supporting the preference to be accorded searches under a
warrant, indicated that in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant
may be sustainable where without one it would fall”) (emphasis added) (loosely
citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697
(1960)).6 Put plainly, according to the State and at least some of the federal case

Defendants claim the citation in Vantresca to Jones is “loose[]” because page
270 of the Jones decision does not indicate the evidentiary requirement in
warrant cases was lower than in non-warrant cases, although Vantresca seems to
say that it does. What page 270 in Jones does indicate is that warrants should not
require more evidence, or “evidence of a more judicially competent or persuasive
character”, than would support probable cause without a warrant, and that in
close cases “it is most important that resort be had to a warrant, so that the
evidence in the possession of the police may be weighed by an independent
judicial officer”. Jones, 270. In other words, Jones wants to ensure that the police
are not being disincentivised to seek a warrant. This is very different than saying
6
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law, a search does not really need to be based on probable cause if a magistrate
was willing to sign a warrant.
The standard of review distinction between probable cause and the
somewhat lower standard in warrant cases is ruinous to the explicit
constitutional requirement that “no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause”.
This Court should take this opportunity to “support, obey and defend… the
Constitution of this State” by implementing a Utah standard of review that
requires warrants to be supported by probable cause, period. UTAH CONST., art.
IV, sec. 10. Even if this Court feels compelled to start its analysis by examining
federal precedent, any such “precedent is certainly not controlling if
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment are inconsistent or confused.” State v.
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d
1196, 1205-06 (Utah 1995)). Federal precedent which interprets the explicit
probable cause requirement and concludes there is a distinction between
probable cause to support a warrantless search and something less than probable
cause to support a warrant is inconsistent with the plain language of the
constitution and confused. This Court should feel no obligation follow these cases
or apply the federal standard of review when reviewing challenges based on
Utah’s constitution.
Defendants contend that federal efforts to encourage officers to follow the

probable cause for a warrant requires less evidence than non-warrant probable
cause as Vantresca, and by extension the State, interprets it.
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constitutional demand for warrants, while arguably motivated by proper intent,
have had the (perhaps) unintended consequence of diminishing and
undermining the rights and standards explicitly provided by our constitution.
Attempts to follow that federal path, toward diminished constitutional
protection, is at odds with an oath to support, obey, and defend Utah’s
constitution. Both as judges and as members of the bar we have sworn fidelity to
the protection of these rights. It is in light of that duty that appellate counsel
urges to the Court to consider this case as a whole, and specifically the applicable
standard of proof. Defendants urge the Court to reject the standard of review
propagated by the federal case law and apply this Court’s traditional mixed
question standard, reviewing factual findings for clear error and the existence of
probable cause for correctness. “[T]his two-standard approach takes into accout
the relative functions of the trial and appellate courts while ensuring the
consistent and uniform protection of a fundamental civil liberty.” State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 (Utah 1993) (citing State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296,
1299 (Utah 1991)).
B. Relevant Search and Seizure Law
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.” UTAH CONST., ART. I, SECT. 14. Despite the simplicity of the language used
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in Utah’s constitution, there has been great confusion about what the right
actually means, how it can be vindicated, and under what circumstances the
government can infringe upon the right.
Confusion about the breadth and depth of the federal counterpart in the
Fourth Amendment has been propagated by years of contradictory case law. See
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-72 (Utah 1985) (J. Zimmerman concurring)
(describing the federal search and seizure law as a “labyrinth of rules built upon a
series of contradictory and confusing rationalizations and distinctions”). It is in
this context, the confused and contradictory Fourth Amendment case law, that
the Defendants in this case come before this Court seeking a simple and
straightforward application of Utah’s right, as a distinct and independent source
of protection from government interference in the lives of the people of Utah.
Based upon the trial court’s ruling and the State’s appeal, the question in
this section is whether, according to Utah’s constitutional requirements, the
magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude the warrant application
established “probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.” UTAH
CONST., ART. I, SECT. 14.7 Or, if the Court accepts Defendants’ invitation and
applies the constitutionally sound standard of review, the only question is
The question of whether the affidavit particularly described “the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized” was not address in the court
below and the record does not include any facts about whether the description in
the affidavit is accurate. Therefore, Defendants limit their argument to the
question of probable cause.
7
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whether the trial court erred in concluding the affidavit didn’t establish probable
cause. Defendants assert this Court can answer both questions in the negative.
“Since our Constitution requires a showing of probable cause to support a
search warrant… we hold, in line with the overwhelming weight of authority in
the federal and state courts” that an affidavit is “not sufficient if it is made on
information and belief, and is not corroborated or supported in any way.” Allen v.
Lindbeck, 93 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1939). In Allen, a statute authorized the
issuance of a warrant if the affiant “deposes that he has reason to believe and
does believe the articles are wrongfully held or used.” Allen, 93 P.2d 920, 922.
This Court concluded the statute was unconstitutional where it authorized a
warrant, because probable cause was not “satisfied by an oath that one has reason
to believe and does believe.” Allen, 922.
Probable cause in Utah is more than suspicion, and it is more than
reasonable belief. Probable cause is defined as an “apparent state of facts that a
discreet and prudent man would be led to the belief that the accused, at the time
of the application for the warrant, was in possession of the property.” Allen, 97
Utah 471, 477 (quoting Cornelius on Search and Seizure, § 83). Defendants assert
that the use of the word “was” in that sentence is crucially important. The term is
not ‘might be’ or even ‘is likely’. The discreet and prudent person, based on the
information he possesses, believes some set of facts ‘is’ the case.
The distinction between the level of evidence the statute in Allen required
and probable cause required by section 14 is an important distinction in this case.
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Having reason to believe something means there are facts that one can point to
supporting that belief. Thus, it is not just a hunch, but is based on reason. But
reason to believe is not probable cause. Probable cause must be based upon
enough evidence that a discreet and prudent person, a person who understood
that taking a position on the matter will have serious consequences to the
constitutional rights of another person, would conclude that a certain set of facts
actually exist, that evidence of a crime actually will be found. The difference
between reason to believe and probable cause is what distinguishes the
magistrate’s reading of the affidavit from the trial court’s reading.
There are no hard and fast rules delineating what amount of evidence
creates probable cause. Probable cause must be based upon articulated
particularized facts and circumstances. Mere conclusory statements will not
suffice. The foundation of the existence of facts must be shown, the affiant must
disclose the source of the facts, the reason he knows a fact to be true. If the
affiant, the officer who swears to the facts alleged, does not know the facts based
on his own experience, he must corroborate the allegations of his informants. See
Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah App 1997); Salt Lake v.
Bench, 2008 UT App 30, ¶14, 177 P.3d 655. With those considerations in mind,
courts are instructed to consider the totality of the evidence and make a practical
decision whether there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place. See State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1986).
Defendants assert that this Court will agree with the trial court’s thoughtful
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decision and find the police failed to establish probable cause in the warrant
application.
C. Application
1. Did the affidavit establish probable cause?
The information collected by the police came entirely from CI. And almost
all the information provided by CI was conclusory, and unsupported by reference
to CI’s knowledge or experience. For example, the State points to the statement
from CI that “Mike” travels to California to obtain marijuana to sell it in “vacuum
sealed” bags. State’s Brief at 16, see R.202, 062. But none of these facts are
supported in the affidavit by reference to how CI knew these facts. Perhaps there
is a possible inference from CI’s statement that he “has been in Mike’s home in
the past and has made drug purchases from him.” R.062. But that statement
gives no time frame, nor does it make any reference to any facts that could lead
the magistrate to suspect CI’s claim was actually based on observation or
information recent enough to support ongoing suspicion.
According to the affidavit, the CI did not say he saw drugs in vacuum
sealed packages or give any facts to show how he knew that is how they were
packaged, in fact the CI admitted to the police that he did not know where in the
house the drugs were kept, suggesting the CI had not seen drugs in the house.
R.062. The affidavit did not include evidence that the drugs CI delivered to the
police were vacuum sealed or any other evidence to suggest CI’s production of
drugs to the police corroborated his earlier statements.
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The affidavit did not include a claim that the CI observed Mike drive to
California to purchase drugs, or any other facts from which anyone could
conclude the CI had some personal knowledge about that fact. Nothing in the
affidavit suggests the police had any information to show CI’s statements about
his interactions with “Mike” were anything more than mere conclusory
statements from CI. According to the affidavit, CI’s statements about “Mike” and
his alleged distribution activities are nothing more than the “information and
belief” at issue in Allen.
As the affidavit made clear, and as the trial court reasonably found, despite
their efforts to confirm CI’s statements by checking records, the officers were
“ultimately unsuccessful in corroborating any information provided by the CI.”
R.202 (emphasis added). This factual finding, that the police did not corroborate
any information provided by the CI, has not been challenged as clearly erroneous
by the State on appeal,8 therefore this Court will not disturb those findings. See
State v. Gurule, 2013 UT 58, ¶20, 321 P.3d 1039. The police did not know who
“Mike” was, they did not know of his reputation or know of any prior drug
involvements. And the police did not “attempt to corroborate any other innocent
information provided by the informant.” R.202. The officers were satisfied to

A search of the State’s brief reveals no mention of the “clearly erroneous”
standard of review applied to a trial court’s factual findings. While the State’s
brief does assert that the “controlled buy fully corroborated the CI’s report…”,
nothing in the State’s brief suggests the State is actually challenging the factual
findings of the trial court.
8
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accept the CI’s word, which had not been and, apparently could not be, verified or
confirmed in any way.
This blind trust in CI’s unsupported statements continued as the officers
had CI arrange to buy drugs. After the police searched his person CI made a
supervised phone call with “Mike”, but that supervision does not describe
whether or how officers knew who, if anyone, CI was talking to. R.062. There is
no mention of the number CI dialed, there is no mention making a recording. The
officers’ supervision of the communication with “Mike” apparently consisted of
listening to CI as he spoke into a cell phone and discussed purchasing “a
predetermined amount of marijuana… for a predetermined amount of money” to
occur at “Mike’s” residence, the same residence the police had not been able to
connect to any person or confirm that anyone named Mike lived there. R.062.
The police then sent CI back into his unsearched car and followed him as
he drove to the house in Provo and then went into the house. There is nothing in
the affidavit suggesting the officers could see what was happening in the house,
or whether or not CI was even met at the door by anyone, it just says he “arrived
at the residence… and went inside.” R.062. “A short time passed and the CI was
seen leaving the residence.” R.062. Other than CI’s presence at the listed address,
the affidavit is devoid of any fact that would support or corroborate any of what
CI later says happened in the house. After CI exited the house he got back into his
unsearched car and drove back to meet up with the police. At that point CI did
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not have the money on his person and did have drugs, which he said he bought
from “Mike”. R.062.
The trial court considered three main factors in its totality of the
circumstances review: CI’s reliability, the basis of his knowledge, and the degree
to which CI’s assertions could be corroborated. R.204. In each instance the trial
court found the facts presented were unpersuasive. The State, in its brief, now
argues the opposite inference. State’s Brief at 16-17. However, the State’s
arguments, about the reasons to believe CI, and his incentives to tell the truth,
are all dependent upon the validity of the controlled buy. For example, the State
argues that CI was a known defendant so he was “exposed to possible criminal
and civil prosecution if the report was false.” State’s Brief at 16 (quoting State v.
Royball, 2010 UT 34, ¶16, 232 P.3d 1016). If anything CI had said could have
been verified, then perhaps this argument makes sense, but as demonstrated by
the lack of any personal knowledge, CI’s statements to the police were more like
the recitation of a rumor than a declaration of known facts. According to the
affidavit, CI never told the police he knew or had personal experience of any of
these facts, so in what way could they be false?
The State also argues that CI “risked losing the benefit of leniency in his
criminal case if his report proved to be false.” State’s Brief at 16. This argument
presumes the police had some way of determining whether “his report proved to
be false”, and yet the facts demonstrated by the affidavit and found by the trial
court showed the risk of “losing the benefit” is a fantasy. Consider the situation
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of the CI, he facing his own criminal case(s) and decided he would try to
cooperate with the police in order to gain some favor. There was no risk in losing
something he didn’t already have. Either it goes well so he gets the benefit of
cooperation, or his information is not credible and doesn’t pan out and he is
exactly where he was to begin with. Further, there was no risk to CI because his
facts were vague and unchallengeable and the police allowed him to tell a story
and then failed to corroborate any part of it.
What is most flawed about the State’s position regarding CI’s reliability is
its characterization of the information CI provided. Nothing about the affidavit
reflects that the allegations CI reported were “based on his first-hand”
knowledge. State’s Brief at 17. Instead, most of the allegations were merely bare
assertions of fact without explanation of how CI would know it. The details about
“Mike’s” operations were very likely not based on personal knowledge, like the
California detail, or the drugs being stored in some unknown location. The
affidavit reveals the police, and the magistrate, had no reason to credit CI with
any degree of reliability. As the trial court noted, these weaknesses were
compounded when the police were unsuccessful in their attempts to
“corroborat[e] any information provided by the CI.” R.202.
Finally, the State suggests CI’s admission that “he himself ‘has made drug
purchases’ from Mike at his home.” State’s Brief at 17. The State relies upon State
v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, ¶18, 104 P.3d 1265, to show that because CI admitted to
committing a crime, that admission created “probable cause to search.” State’s
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Brief at 17 (relying upon United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29
L.Ed.2d 723 (1971). But the problem with that position is that the admission here,
that CI purchased marijuana from “Mike” at some unknown time, is far different
than the admissions which created probable cause in Harris. There the Court
conceded that “admissions of crime do not always lend credibility to
contemporaneous or later accusations of another.” Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584. In
fact, it was only because the informant’s admissions in Harris was of ongoing and
long term illegal activity, “that over a long period and currently he had been
buying illicit liquor on certain premises, itself and without more, implicated that
property and furnished probable cause.” Id. CI’s admission, to having bought
marijuana an undisclosed number of times without any description of when, does
not rise to the level of reliability mentioned in Harris. His vague admission
would not subject himself to the threat of criminal liability and thus not make his
statements more credible.
The State dismisses the trial court’s concerns about the lack of “control”
because “an affidavit is judged on the adequacy of what it does contain” not what
a “critic might say should have been added.” State’s Brief at 19 (quoting United
States v. Kinson, 710 F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 2013)). The State thinks the trial
court’s criticism of the “controlled” buy has to do with what affidavit does not
contain; it thinks the court had doubts about probable cause because it wanted
the officers to have done something other than what they did. That isn’t it. The
Court had doubts about probable cause because of what the officers did do. The
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officers saw CI drive up in his car without any idea what was in his car. The
officers allowed CI get back into his car, still having no idea what was in his car.
The officers allowed CI to spend time in the car, alone. This is not a matter of the
trial court imagining and demanding the perfect scenario, it is recognizing how
the facts recited by the officers undermine a reasonable belief that what CI said
happened was the truth.
When all these factors are considered, CI’s lack of credibility, the officer’s
failure to corroborate any of his claims, and the complete lack of control over the
buy, the trial court’s conclusion that the affidavit did not establish probable cause
is correct. Compare State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993). This Court
should affirm the trial court’s decision.
2. Did the magistrate have a substantial basis to conclude the
affidavit established probable cause?
As argued above, Defendants contend that the “substantial basis” standard
of review is unconstitutional because it reduces the level of evidence needed to
support a warrant, and that this Court should apply a correctness review on the
question of whether the affidavit established probable cause. However, if the
Court is content to apply the federal standard of review, Defendants maintain, for
all the reasons explained above, that the magistrate would not have had a
substantial basis to conclude there was probable cause evidence of a crime would
be found in the house.
To the extent that “a substantial basis” for probable cause is a lower
standard than probable cause there are federal cases applying this standard
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which demonstrate the lack of substantial basis. In addition to the concerns
argued above, the magistrate would not have had a substantial basis to concluded
probable cause existed because the affidavit contained significant errors that
called into question the officer’s own credibility. For example, the officer
acknowledges he has only recently met CI “in the past 72 hours”. R.062. In the
next paragraph he claims “[t]he CI has provided creditable information and has
not said anything that would prove false or misleading. The information the CI
has given has been investigated and proved credible.” R.062.
One might ask, what information has been investigated and proved
credible? Obviously, it was not the fact that “Mike” lived at the address, because
officers had “attempted through every avenue to try and identify Mike”, including
“[r]ecords checks on the residence, registrations of vehicles, and requesting
information from other agencies”, all of which failed to corroborate CI’s claims.
R.063. It was not the information CI provided about prior drug buys from
“Mike”, nor was it the fact that “Mike” packages his products in vacuum sealed
bags. In fact, the only fact that CI provided to the officers that was verified in any
way was the claim that, on the day of the buy, CI bought marijuana from this
unknown person at the house and then CI presented marijuana to the officers.
But that corroboration was significantly undermined by the lack of control.
Obviously, the drugs could have come from CI, the person “familiar with drug
distribution and drug practices” who was currently seeking “leniency for pending
charges”. R.062.
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The magistrate would not have had a substantial basis to believe anything at
all would be found at that house, that “Mike” was a real person, or that anyone,
other than CI, had access to marijuana. Even under the lower “substantial basis”
standard of review, this Court should affirm the trial court’s decision by finding
the warrant was improperly issued by the magistrate.
II. THE UTAH CONSTITUTION REQUIRES EXCLUSION OF
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
A. Larocco, Sims, Thompson, Debooy
The State acknowledges Larocco, Thompson, Sims, and Debooy as cases in
which this Court has recognized the independent exclusionary rule for violations
of article I, section 14. State’s Brief at 22-24. And whatever criticism may be made
about the underlying reasoning of any or all of those cases, the fact of the matter
cannot be doubted, the current state of the law in Utah is that “exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of
article I, section 14.” State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) (quoting State
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)). As it stands, the trial court was correct
when it concluded it did not have “authority to depart from binding precedent.”
R.185. Defendants assert that this precedent is still binding, on every court in this
state, unless and until this Court reverses these former decisions.
B. This Court should not overturn its precedent
1. Stare decisis
“Stare decisis ‘is a cornerstone of Anglo-American jurisprudence’ because it
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‘is crucial to the predictability of the law and fairness of adjudication.’” Eldridge,
2015 UT 21, ¶21 (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993)).
Thus, this Court will not overturn its own precedents “lightly”; instead it will only
do so if the precedent is not considered “weighty” because it was not (1) based on
persuasive authority and reasoning, and is not (2) firmly established in the law
since it was handed down. Eldridge, 2015 UT 21, ¶22. Defendants now assert that
this Court should not overrule the above cited precedent establishing a state
exclusionary rule arising from article I, section 14. Defendants assert the Utah
exclusionary rule was based upon sound authority and reasoning and is firmly
established in Utah’s constitutional case law.
There can be little doubt that this Court’s decision, recognizing the state
exclusionary rule, in Larocco, and repeated in Sims and Thompson, has been the
subject of debate and criticism.9 But that criticism has not resulted in overturning
the precedent. Utah constitutional law, as it currently stands, provides that
“[e]xclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police
violations of article I, section 14.” Larocco, 794 P.2d at 472 (and repeated
verbatim by four justices in State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419).
Because of that status, in order to overturn these cases and reverse course
away from the constitutional requirement of exclusion, this Court must not only
find that the prior precedent is lightweight enough to be overturned, but it must
also find that it should be overturned, that some alternative to exclusion is a more
9

See State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ¶¶27-58 (J. Lee, concurring).
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sound and constitutionally viable path. Defendants assert that the Larocco/
Thompson precedent is weighty enough to withstand scrutiny, and if not, given
the opportunity to determine the scope of our constitutional protection, this
Court should still reach the same result. As the trial court put it, “[e]ven if it could
disregard precedent and strike out on its own, this Court [should] for the reasons
stated below leave the exclusionary rule firmly ensconced in state search and
seizure jurisprudence.” R.185-86.
The State claims the Thompson decision is “not the most weighty of
precedents” because it “did not [analyze]10 the text or history of Article I, § 14,
and failed to acknowledge, much less explain why it was departing from, this
Court’s long-standing precedent rejecting a state exclusionary rule for violations
of Article I, § 14.” State’s Brief at 23. Defendants’ reading of Thompson is
different. Thompson relied upon the reasoning of Larocco to recognize the
exclusionary rule of section 14, and by extension, it relied upon Larocco’s
explanation. See Thompson, 419. The decision in Larocco certainly did examine
the text of section 14, and considered how the two clauses related to each other
and how different courts at different times have applied different approaches.
Larocco, 467. Defendants defend this Court’s holding in Thompson, and the
plurality’s reasoning in Larocco, as well reasoned, weighty, and capable of
supporting the conclusion that violations of section 14 are subject to exclusion of
There appears to be a typographical error in this sentence of the State’s Brief.
Without wanting to alter the meaning of the State’s argument, appellant counsel
inserted the term “analyze” to make sense of the sentence.
10
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illegally obtained evidence.
The interesting thing about the State’s position about Thompson is that it
begs the question, did “this Court’s long-standing precedent rejecting a state
exclusionary rule” analyze the text or history of Article I? In other words, this
long-standing precedent, State v. Aime, when it rejected the idea of exclusion, did
the Court consider the 24 years of precedent the text of section 14 had
established, did it analyze the text of the constitution, did it consider the original
intent of the drafters? The State’s attempt to criticize the holding in Thompson as
not being weighty enough ignores the absolute dearth of textual analysis or
reasoning in Aime.
While the decision in Aime does devote several pages citing decisions from
other jurisdictions, those citations focus primarily on the principle that courts
“will not take notice of the manner in which a witness has possessed himself of
papers or other chattles” because to do so “would halt the orderly progress of a
cause in the consideration of an incidental question”. Aime, 220 P. 703, 706
(citing Banks v. State, 93 So. 293 (Ala. 1921). The text of section 14 is nowhere to
be found in the Aime decision, nor is there any mention of what, if any, remedy
the constitutional framers intended section 14 to create.
This criticism demonstrates the real crux of the problem with earlyUtah
constitutional law in general. This Court’s decisions have not always met the high
standard its recent case law has established. Defendants encourage the Court to
take this opportunity, to leave no stone unturned and issue a decision that will
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clarify the meaning of section 14 and the justifications upon which it depends.
2. The text of the Utah Constitution supports exclusion
If the Court is inclined to find that the precedent of Larocco, Sims,
Thompson, and Debooy should not be followed as a matter of stare decisis, and
that the doctrine of an independent state exclusionary rule should be
reconsidered, Defendants believe that this Court’s analysis of section 14 should
reestablish exclusion as the necessary and proper remedy for violations of Utah’s
search and seizure protections.
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.” UTAH CONST., ART. I, SECT. 14. For the purposes of this brief Defendants
will divide section 14 into two main sections, the security section, and the
probable cause section. Neither of those sections explicitly require the Court to
exclude evidence obtained from a violation of the rights. However, Defendants
contend that the meaning of the text, the meaning of the rights, implies exclusion
as fundamental to the right.
First, the probable cause section. The plain text requires that no warrant
shall issue without probable cause. There is no room for debate, warrants shall
not issue without probable cause. But what if a warrant does issue without
probable cause? It happens, it happened in this case. Then what? The State
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argues that the text of section 14 “does not impose or otherwise contemplate an
exclusionary remedy.” According to the State, because the text does not explicitly
create a “rule of evidence” making illegally obtained evidence inadmissible, there
is not textual support for exclusion. State’s Brief at 33-34 (citing Aime, 220 P. at
707). Put simply, from the State’s perspective, because the language of section 14
does not use the words suppression or exclusion there is no way such a remedy is
required by the constitution. Defendants contend that exclusion is not the
equivalent of a rule of evidence and that the language of the constitution does not
need be explicit for exclusion to be constitutionally required.
Exclusion is not about admissibility; it is not as though illegally obtained
evidence is being excluded because the Court has misgivings about the evidence’s
reliability, as if it were a concern about foundation, reliability, or authentication.
Admissibility and the rules of evidence have as their aim the admission of reliable
and competent evidence, so as to get as near to the truth as possible. Illegally
obtained evidence may be very reliable. In many cases, evidence discovered by
violating the constitution may be the most reliable source of evidence about what
the defendant is accused of doing. Reliability has no bearing on the question of
whether the government should be allowed to use it as evidence at trial. As
unpleasant as it may sound, exclusion is not about the truth, exclusion is about
the fundamental right of individuals to security in their homes, in the privacy of
their own lives, past, present, and future. Reliable or not, exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence is about the fundamental and invaluable limits on the powers
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of the government. Exclusion of evidence is about the fundamental value in
maintaining a government which obeys its own laws.11
Exclusion does not make evidence merely inadmissible, it makes it utterly
unavailable to the state. Exclusion removes from the government the power to
use the fruits of its own crimes in any way, and restores to the individual the
security guaranteed by the constitution, curing the past harm as well as
protecting against present and future violations. Exclusion is about undoing the
government’s wrongs, cleaning the government’s hands, and re-securing an
individual’s person and property.
Presumably, according to the State’s logic, because section 14 does not
explicitly describe the process of exclsuion, the rights in section 14 are merely
lofty goals for the government to aspire to, that have no constitutional means of
enforcement. See State’s Brief at 33. The State’s position presumes that the
constitutional framers intentionally designed these constitutional rights to be
impotent, and without any remedy. Defendants implore the Court to reject this
logic as destructive to the fundamental rights we, as a constitutionally based
society, hold most sacred.
Instead, Defendants propose the alternative logic of ‘where there is a right,
there is a remedy.’12 Defendants propose that the constitutional framers intended

11

See State v. Buckley, 258 P. 1030 (Wash. 1927) (“it is beneath the dignity of the
state, and contrary to public policy, for the state to use for its own profit evidence
that has been obtained in violation of the law.”
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the rights recognized in section 14 to be self-executing. Security in one’s home
and person and property is its own remedy, the right is the remedy. The right to
security and the remedy of exclusion of evidence in a criminal case are
synonymous. Exclusion ‘breathes life’ into the right to security. See Brierley v.
Layton City, 2016 UT 46, ¶20. Exclusion is the vindication or the restoration of
the right to security. When the government breaks the law, and violates one’s
right to security in one’s home, exclusion is at least a partial restoration of that
security.
The State would have the Court adopt the faulty reasoning in Leon that
pretends that once the police have violated a person’s rights by unlawfully
entering and searching his home, or seizing himself or his property, the damage
is done, or “fully accomplished”, and exclusion “is neither intended nor able to
cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.” State’s
Brief at 43 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 906). This argument fails to comprehend the
scope of the right to security, and the potential for ongoing violations created by
the government’s use of illegal evidence.
Defendants assert that right to security enshrined in section 14 does not
evaporate once the government violates it. The fact that the government violated
Defendants’ rights to be secure in their home, and to the privacy enjoyed therein,
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of
the laws, whenever he receives an injury… Blackstone states [that]… ‘it is a
general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.’”).
12
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on August 28, 2012 does not forever extinguish those rights. Michael Rowan and
Rebecca George are still entitled to security in their home and the privacy they
had there, even today, even years after the government violated those rights. At
this very moment, by virtue of section 14 Defendants maintain the right to be
secure from unreasonable searches of their home, past, present, and future. That
includes the right in the future to be secure from the government’s past illegal
conduct. At this moment Defendants maintain the right to demand security in
their home, and to demand that judicial officers not allow the government to
expose private details from their home. Security means the government cannot
continue to violate one’s rights long after the police drive away from the house by
using evidence derived from illegal conduct.
Exclusion puts the Defendants, whose security has been violated, back into
the legal standing they enjoyed before the government destroyed the sanctity and
security of their home. Exclusion vindicates the ongoing right to privacy, to
security in the home, to security in the privacy of the contents and activities in the
home. And while exclusion may not perfectly restore a person to his pre-violation
status, while his door may still be smashed-in and his property flung from
drawers, exclusion does restore the legal circumstances by removing the evidence
collected from the violation from the government’s use, where it would have been
if the violation had not occurred. While exclusion does not perfectly replace every
item disturbed or confiscated by illegal government conduct, it at least returns a
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defendant to same security status, where the government is not allowed
continued access to use the secure details of his private life against him.
Without exclusion, Defendants’ right to security and privacy is repeatedly
violated, over and over, as the details of their private lives are exposed to
attorneys and clerks, and journalists to judges and jurors, and to the public at
large. Without exclusion, Defendants’ right to security in the past, present, and
future is permanently denied. Exclusion not only specifically remedies the prior
illegal conduct (by attempting to repair the harm done to defendant and
removing the ill-gotten advantage gained by the government) but it also stops the
government’s ongoing violation by ending the government’s access to and use of
a defendant’s person or property. In this way exclusion gives meaning to the
right;13 without exclusion Defendants’ right to security is repeatedly and endlessly
violated. Without the remedy of exclusion, the substantive right to security in
one’s own home is merely aspirational, merely a suggestion. This Court should
not accept the State’s position that language of our constitutional right, the right
to be secure from illegal search and seizure, to be a right without any real life
meaning or function.
When the framers of the Utah Constitution wrote section 14, they would
have understood that the right to be secure from unreasonable searches was an
actual right, not merely an empty aspirational goal for the government to do its
See Douglas Laycock, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 1 (4th ed. 2010)
("Remedies give meaning to obligations imposed by the rest of the substantive
law… [Remedies are] the means by which legal obligations are given effect.").
13
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best to comply with, except when it didn’t suit its investigative purposes. The
Utah framers would have understood that security in one’s home and personal
effects was an ongoing right and did not end after the government committed a
violation. In order to give meaning to those real and ongoing rights, the framers
would have understood there must be a way to protect and enforce that right, into
the future, especially for those whose rights had been violated. The framers, in
light of Boyd (see infra), would have imbued the language of section 14 with an
understanding that security in one’s home includes preventing the government
from continued intrusion by using illegally obtained evidence at a trial. The
framers would have understood that exclusion is part and parcel of the right of
the people to be secure from government crimes.
3. The historical context supports exclusion
The historical context of 1890’s search and seizure law supports the
conclusion that the framers of the Utah constitution intended section 14 to
require exclusion of evidence.
The Utah Constitution of 1895 was the last in a long line of attempts by the
Territory of Utah/Deseret to become a state. Beginning as early as 184914 the
settlers assembled in constitutional conventions and repeatedly attempted to
establish a constitution. While those efforts resulted in numerous iterations of a
proposed constitution, none of these proposals were accepted by the United
States. It wasn’t until after the Congress passed the Enabling Act in 1894 that
See Dale Morgan, State of Deseret, Utah Historical Quarterly, 8 (1940), page
85.
14
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Utah had any chance of becoming a state. The final 1895 version of the Utah
Constitution, including the Declaration of Rights of article I, had been evolving
for forty-five years, with small changes to structure and content, usually
borrowing portions from the federal and other state constitutions, including
those of recently added sister states.15 “The convention borrowed heavily from
earlier Utah constitutions and other state constitutions, particularly those of
Nevada, Washington, Illinois, and New York and retained the antigovernment
philosophy which marked Utah’s Constitutions of 1872, 1882, and 1887.” John
Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government -- The History of Utah’s
Constitution, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 311, 323.
“The development of Utah constitutional thought thus shows familiarity
with constitutional development on other states, and demonstrates that Utah,
despite her experiments in marriage and economic relationships, was not ready
to depart from the traditional forms of American government”. HICKMAN, at 74.
This familiarity of constitutional development would have included the framers
being familiar the United States Supreme Court’s decisions.
4. Boyd v. United States
In 1895, when the framers of Utah’s constitution were basing section 14
upon the text and meaning of the Fourth Amendment, exclusion was part of the
Fourth Amendment.
See MARTIN HICKMAN, Utah Constitutional Law, 40-78 (unpublished doctoral
dissertation available at the University of Utah J. Williard Marriott Library and
the Brigham Young University Harold B. Lee Library).
15
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Right in the middle of Utah’s constitutional evolution, in 1886, the United
States Supreme Court considered the case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), where the defendant claimed an 1874 law
requiring him to produce his private books and papers in a case against him
violated the Fourth Amendment. At trial he objected to the government requiring
him to provide this evidence but his argument failed and he lost the trial based
upon that evidence. In its opinion, the Supreme Court recalled the “recent history
of the controversies on the subject, both in this country and in England” related
to the issuance of writs of assistance allowing the authorities to search for
evidence of smuggled goods. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25. The Court concluded
that application of the law constituted an illegal search or seizure and that the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment prevented the federal government from forcing a
person to produce evidence in this manner. Most importantly for the purposes of
this case, the Court ordered that the “judgment of the Circuit Court should be
reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to award a new trial.” Boyd,
116 U.S. 616, 638.
In other words, the illegal search and seizure of property and the use of the
illegally obtained evidence at trial violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court
ordered a new trial which would have to proceed without the use of the illegally
seized evidence because “its admission in evidence by the court, [was] erroneous
and unconstitutional proceedings.” Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 638. Without using the
terms suppression or exclusion, the United States Supreme Court, in 1886, ruled
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that evidence obtained in violation the Fourth Amendment must not be used in a
criminal trial. In 1886, and relevantly in 1895, the language of the Fourth
Amendment meant that search and seizure violations resulted in exclusion. This
is the meaning of language of the federal constitution that the Utah framers
would have been looking to.
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d
1229 (Utah 1996) wrote a thoughtful statement about how the framers of the
Utah Constitution must have felt about the rights they were enshrining in article
I. Because the federal Bill of Rights was not incorporated into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment until much later, “the framers of the Utah
Constitution… viewed their own state constitutional provisions as the sole source
of constitutional protection for those individual liberties enshrined” in our state
declaration of rights. Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1240 (J. Stewart, concurring in the
result). Those framers would not have had any reason to expect that the citizens
of Utah would be protected from state actors by the Fourth Amendment or by the
exclusionary rule announced in Boyd. Because of that lack of protection, these
constitutional authors wanted to protect the citizens of Utah from the same kinds
of state government overreach that the Fourth Amendment provided from the
federal government. If the framers of the Utah Constitution only wanted the
citizens of Utah to be protected from the federal government and not from the
action of state authorities, there would have been no need to enact article I,
section 14, no need to repeat the language that had been interpreted to require
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exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. But those framers enacted section 14
demonstrating an obvious desire to protect the people of Utah from the actions of
the state government.
This protection would have been made in light of the holding in Boyd, and
the then existing exclusionary function of the language of the Fourth
Amendment. It would have been made considering the United State Supreme
Court’s rejection of the earlier longstanding proposition that illegally seized
evidence could still be admitted. Instead, understanding that the Fourth
Amendment protected Boyd from the use of illegally obtained evidence by US
Marshalls at his trial, the Utah framers used nearly identical language to protect
Utahans from state actors using illegally obtained evidence in state cases.
The State points to Justice Lee’s concurring opinion in Walker, 2011 UT
53, ¶49, where he points out that “no appellate court in any state had excluded
unlawfully obtained evidence under its constitution” in 1895. State’s Brief at 37,
fn.4. Presumably this suggests that other states did not believe their constitutions
required exclusion, and therefore neither would have the Utah framers. But this
fact means very little in context because Boyd, and its recognition of exclusion as
a constitutionally mandated remedy, was issued in 1886, long after most states
had adopted their constitutions with a pre-Boyd understanding of the Fourth
Amendment. The framers of those earlier state constitutions would arguably not
have understood their own constitutions, though similar to the federal
constitution, to require exclusion because, at the time they were ratified,
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exclusion under the Fourth Amendment was not yet recognized. But in 1895, nine
years after Boyd, Utah’s constitutional framers who looked to the language of the
Fourth Amendment and its recognized meaning at the time would have
understood that exclusion was part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment’s right
against illegal search and seizure. The fact that earlier states had not interpreted
their own constitutions, ratified before Boyd, to require exclusion should not
mean Utah’s framers would have had a similar intent.
Defendants dispute the State’s position that exclusion as a constitutional
requirement would have been foreign to the drafters of the Utah Constitution.
Based on the historical setting and the state of the Fourth Amendment case law
after Boyd in 1889, exclusion was the constitutionally required remedy for
violations of search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Utah’s drafters
would have been aware of the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment. The framers would have understood that, according to
Boyd, if evidence had been illegally obtained any judgment based on that
evidence was illegitimate and should result in reversal and a new trial without the
illegal evidence.
“It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes essence of the offence; but it is the invasion
of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and
private property,… it is the invasion of this sacred right which
underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden’s Judgment.
Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are
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circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory
extortion of a man’s… private papers to be used as evidence to convict
him of crime… is within the condemnation of that judgment.”
Boyd, 630. The framers would have understood the that the similar
language they used in section 14 would have had the same meaning.
Defendants assert that this Court should not overturn the precedent of
Larocco and Thompson. The Court should reaffirm the authority of the Utah
Constitution to protect our citizens from the unreasonable and unwarranted
intrusions of an at times overzealous government, independent of the
inconsistent and unpredictable federal exclusionary rule. This Court should take
an active role in supporting, obeying, and defending the rights of Utahans as it
interprets the meaning of our own founding document. Defendants asks the
Court to contemplate what security from unreasonable search and seizure means
it if a violation has no consequence. Defendants ask the Court to consider
whether the use of illegally obtained evidence would not be itself another
violation of the right to be secure in one’s home, papers, and effects. Does one
lose the right of security in these places and property for ever after once the
government commits the initial violation? Defendants ask the Court to defend
our security from government intrusion, even after the intrusion occurs.
Defendants assert that exclusion of evidence is not a mere a judicial remedy
tacked on the back end to try to deter future violations. Exclusion is a
continuation of the right to security; exclusion is security from unlawful state
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action after a violation has occurred. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, homes, and property includes the right to prevent the government from
using illegally obtained evidence.
III. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT RECOGNIZE A GOOD FAITH
EXCEPTION TO UTAH’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. Prior precedent implicitly shows there is no good faith
exception to Utah’s exclusionary rule
This Court has previously stated that it has yet to decide whether the state
exclusionary rule is subject to a good faith exception. “We leave for another day
the issue of whether to apply in appropriate circumstances a good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule to article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.”
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 420. However, when faced with the opportunity to
recognize a good faith exception the Court did not do so.
In State v. Debooy, 2000 UT 546, ¶1, the defendant was convicted of drug
possession charges and appealed his case challenging the constitutionality of a
checkpoint where the police discovered evidence of crimes. The police filed an
application with a magistrate requesting authorization to conduct an
“administrative highway checkpoint” with the intent to inspect or detect traffic
and safety related violations, and “[o]ther alcohol and/or controlled substance
violations.” Debooy, ¶2. The magistrate authorized the checkpoint and the
defendant was investigated when he was stopped. Id, ¶¶3-4. While stopped at the
checkpoint the officers asked consent to search, received it, and discovered
“contraband in a backpack in the trunk.” Id., ¶4.
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On appeal this Court found that the section 14 and the Fourth Amendment
have not “always been interpreted the same way” and that this Court “will not
hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different construction where doing so will
more appropriately protect the rights of this state’s citizens.” Id., ¶12. The Court
considered federal cases examining checkpoints but “solely for their persuasive
value, and [did] not regard them as binding for purposes of state law.” Id, ¶19.
The Court recognized the interest section 14 has in protecting against practices
similar to general warrants where officers were given authority to search without
specified probable cause. Id., at ¶26.
Eventually the Court concluded that the police checkpoint violated section
14 prohibition that against unreasonable searches and seizures in section 14. Id.,
¶33. Implicitly, the Court found that the police action was not protected by their
good faith reliance upon the magistrate’s authorization. Presumably, if a good
faith exception were to exist under Utah’s Constitution, Debooy would have been
an opportunity to recognize and apply it.
Defendants assert that the erroneous judicial authorization of an
administrative checkpoint that is later executed by the police in good faith is
analogous to the issuance of a warrant that lacks probable cause that is later
executed in good faith by the police. In both instances the constitutional error is
caused by a judicial officer authorizing police action. In both instances the police
have done nothing wrong. And in both instances the defendant’s right to be
secure from unreasonable search or seizure and from warrants without probable
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cause is violated. Debooy demonstrates that section 14 is concerned more about
protecting an individual’s right than it is about punishing the person or
government agency responsible for the violation of the right. Because this Court
did not recognize a good faith exception to section 14 in Debooy when it could
have, the Court should not recognize one here.
B. A good faith exception is inconsistent with the text of Utah’s
Constitution
The text of section 14 requires that “no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause”. UTAH CONST., ART. I, SECT. 14. If the Court were to adopt a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule it would allow the government use
warrants issued without probable cause, in direct defiance of the language of
section 14. A good faith exception would lower the explicit constitutional
requirement of probable cause to some other ‘standard’. What could be more
offensive to the explicit probable cause standard than to judicially acknowledge
the validity of warrants executed without probable cause? As argued in the
standard of proof argument above, the creation of a good faith exception defies
the plain text of section 14 and replaces it. The State would have the Court
effectively amend section 14 as follows: Warrants may issue without probable
cause so long as law enforcement executes the warrant in good faith. This
perversion of one of the most basic tenants of constitutional law should not be
adopted. This Court should defend the language of section 14 and firmly establish
that warrants are invalid if they are not supported by probable cause and when
the government executes an invalid warrant it has violated section 14.
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C. A good faith exception is inconsistent with the purposes of the
exclusionary rule
The State would have the Court adopt the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, (1974)
and find that the only purpose of an exclusionary rule is to deter future
constitutional violations by law enforcement. See State’s Brief at 42-43. But such
a conclusion would be to neuter the constitution and ignore the historical
meaning of exclusion.
Defendants ask the Court to reject Calandria and the relatively modern
view that exclusion is merely a judicial remedy, rather than constitutionally
required. “[T]he Leon holding could not have been reached but for the [U.S.]
Supreme Court’s narrow justification for the exclusionary rule”, that was
accomplished by rewriting history and limiting the purpose of the rule to only
deterring future unlawful police conduct. State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671
(Idaho 1992) (referring to Calandra). Prior to the rewriting of history, the United
States Supreme Court stated in many cases that there were several purposes of
the exclusionary rule, including to protect a person's Fourth Amendment
guarantees by deterring lawless conduct by police officers and to close the
courthouse doors "to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained." Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).16
16

See also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416
(1975) (the dual considerations of deterrence and judicial integrity are
commonplace purposes of the exclusionary rule); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13,
88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (The exclusionary rule serves to deter
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Defendants now assert, and many jurisdictions have agreed, that the U.S.
Supreme Court’s “revisionist history of the exclusionary rule” is inaccurate and
untrue to the spirit and previously acknowledged purposes of the Fourth
Amendment exclusion. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671. That same limited view of
article I, section 14 proposed by the State should not be adopted in Utah. Rather,
unlike the current federal majority vision of the federal exclusionary rule, Utah’s
exclusionary rule has multiple purposes and justifications beyond deterrence of
future police conduct and creating a good faith exception would defeat those
other purposes and justifications.
The exclusionary rule is a vindication of individual constitutional rights. As
explained in Weeks, the prosecution’s use of illegally seized evidence involved “a
denial of the constitutional rights of the accused.” Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 393, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). That would have been similar to
the purpose for exclusion in Boyd, where the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed “a
very grave question of constitutional law, involving the personal security, and
privileges and immunities of the citizen”. Boyd, 618.
That same purpose was recognized in New Jersey when its supreme court
rejected the Leon exception too. The exclusionary “rule also serves as the
indispensable mechanism for vindicating the constitutional right to be free from
police misconduct and preserve judicial integrity, to prevent the courts from
being “made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by
permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions”); Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960) (The
exclusionary rule also serves “the imperative of judicial integrity.”).
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unreasonable searches.” State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 857 (N.J. 1987). In
New Mexico the supreme court’s finding of an independent exclusionary rule did
not focus “on deterrence or judicial integrity, nor do we propose a judicial
remedy; instead, our focus is to effectuate in the pending case the constitutional
right of the accused to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.” State v.
Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1067 (N.M. 1993).
With these additional purposes of the exclusionary rule firmly established,
based in case law, history, and logic, there is no reason to create a good faith
exception. The State’s attempt to do so cannot be said to come from any
reverence to the constitution, but instead from a desire to minimize and dilute
the rights of the people and enlarge power of the government. Given this Court’s
unique responsibility to the Utah Constitution and the rights of the people of
Utah, this Court should view the State’s request very skeptically.
Finally, the history of Utah’s settlers and their experiences with local and
federal government agents in the years immediately preceding 1895 should be
considered when examining what the language of section 14 means. There can be
little doubt that many of the framers were intimately familiar with government
abuses of search and seizure, including the use of general or unsupported
warrants.17 These abuses give critical insight into why the framers would not want
to insulate from review the issuance of an illegal warrant.

17

See Tracey Panek, Search and Seizure in Utah: Recounting the Antipolygamy
Raids, Utah Historical Quarterly, Fall 1994, 319-334.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Because the trial court correctly concluded the affidavit failed to support
probable cause, or because the magistrate did not have a substantial basis to find
probable cause, this court should affirm the granting of Defendant’s motion to
dismiss. This Court should not reverse its cases recognizing the state exclusionary
rule nor create a good faith exception thereto. This Court should affirm.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of November, 2016.
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